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Models As Fictions, Fictions As Models
Gregory Currie*
ABSTRACT
Thinking of models in science as ﬁctions is said to be helpful, not merely because mod-
els are known or assumed to be false, but because work on the nature of ﬁction helps
us understand what models are and how they work. I am unpersuaded. For example,
instead of trying to assimilate truth-in-a model to truth-in-ﬁction we do better to see
both as special and separate cases of the more general notion truth-according-to-a-cor-
pus. Does enlightenment go the other way? Do we better understand ﬁction’s capacity
to generate knowledge by thinking of it as a kind of modelling? If we see, as we should,
ﬁctions and models are parts of larger patterns of cognitive activity that include institu-
tional frameworks, the best answer is no.
Reading a novel we imagine a woman in an unhappy marriage, a detective living in
Baker Street, a plague that turns people to zombies. There is, we know, no woman,
man, or plague such as these works purport to refer to. Reading a physics text we im-
agine a frictionless surface, an incompressible fluid, an object with mass concentrated
at its centre. There are, we know, no such things. We turn to a treatise on economics
and find a population of perfectly rational agents. No such things exist, as we well
know.
There are, apparently, similarities between fictions in the ordinary sense—novels,
short stories, movies and plays—and the constructions of systematic theorizing in
the sciences, natural and social. The sciences regularly appeal to what are called the-
oretical models. These models may be unrealistic in various ways: they fail to take ac-
count of factors known to be in play, as Ehrenfest’s model of thermalisation focuses
on randomness and ignores causal relations between molecules. They postulate enti-
ties which are off the scientific menu and may even be strictly impossible, as with ex-
tended objects with mass concentrated at their centres or Maxwell’s incompressible
fluid; they characterize entities assumed to be real in manifestly unrealistic ways, as
with Thomson’s plum pudding model of the atom, or Fisher’s infinite population of
genes.1 These models often make our problems tractable; with the right choice of
false assumptions we are able to calculate outcomes that are close to the outcomes
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observed. Assumptions like these, known to be false and used without deceptive in-
tent, have long been referred to as fictions.
1. THEORIES OF FICTION
Using the term ‘fiction’ that way serves to indicate that no claim to truth is in play;
such usage has not traditionally been intended to drag with it any very heavy-duty
philosophizing about fiction and its nature, of which there has been a great deal over
the last twenty-five years.2 Recently the idea that science trades in fiction has gone
beyond the acknowledgement that models may be false while being valuable in many
ways to embrace the idea that we might learn something about the scientific practice
of modelling from the way that fictions as ordinarily understood have been theor-
ized.3 For example, philosophers of the arts have been unimpressed by the com-
monly heard suggestion that we “suspend disbelief” in fictions or that we “half
believe” them, or that we in some way undergo an illusion of their reality. They have
also struggled with the problem of fictional characters like Anna Karenina, framing
theories about the “ontological status” of these entities. They have tried to explain
what it is for something to be “true in a fiction” when it is not true, as it is true in
Tolstoy’s novel, but not true, that Anna commits suicide.4 Perhaps we can learn
from these investigations something about the fictions of science, the entities they
postulate, their domains of validity, and our relations to them. Here are some sugges-
tions about what we might learn.
A view now widely held among philosophers is that we need not, and generally
do not, believe in fictional stories or their characters to any degree, and do not en-
gage in any act of suspending our disbelief in them. What we do is imagine them,
and imagination makes available to us the things we might otherwise suppose are de-
pendent on belief, notably emotional and inferential engagement.5 Imagining fearful
things can make us fearful just as believing in them can, and imagining that the de-
tective has been struck on the head induces the consequential imagining that he is
injured, without the author needing to make this explicit. While the affective dimen-
sion of imagination is not of obvious importance in scientific modelling (an issue I’ll
return to) the ability to draw inferences clearly is; that’s exactly what we do with
models in science.
One might object that imagination is too irresponsible an attitude to be useful for
engaging with the models of science. Our imaginings are less constrained than our
beliefs. For exactly what reason is controversial. Popular contenders are: while the
aim of belief is truth, the aim of imagining is not; we choose our imaginings but not
our beliefs.6 But none of this implies that imagining is unconstrained and in certain
circumstances there is a right and a wrong to imagination. Fictions provide rules for
imagining, making certain imaginings appropriate and others not, even when nothing
is explicitly said on the topic. A reader may imagine Anna Karenina to be a Martian
disguised as human; in that case she is not engaging appropriately with the novel.
Even if nothing actually said in the text settles this issue, the novel, taken as a whole
and respecting the implicatures that prevail in realistic fiction, authorizes the imagin-
ing that she is human and not the imagining that she is a Martian; to imagine the lat-
ter is to embark on some fictional enterprise of one’s own.7 Similarly, one may
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imagine various things concerning a scientific model, and many of them would be
wrong, given that one’s project is to use the model for predictive and explanatory
purposes. I can imagine that economic agents are all deeply irrational, but this won’t
be an appropriate imagining if I am interested in using neoclassical theory itself ra-
ther than some construction of my own invention. While it is not true that the sun
and this planet are the only bodies gravitationally interacting, it is true-in-a-certain-
model that they are, and so the use of the model for scientific purposes makes it ap-
propriate to imagine that, at least when the question arises.8 Model builders also
need to keep track of how well the model reflects reality, comparing what is true-in-
the-model with what is true. It is important to the experience of fiction that we do
similar tracking: we cannot fully appreciate Anna Karenina if we do not understand
that a good deal of what is true-in-the-story is also true: that St Petersburg is a city,
that women in Russia at that time had few rights and little independence. Without
that tracking we could not tell a realist novel from a wild fantasy.
Lastly, the assimilation of models to fiction is said to help with understanding
what is being referred to when we describe a scientific model. We talk of frictionless
surfaces in such situations, when in fact there are none; what are we referring to? It
has been suggested that models are structures with abstract entities and relations as
their constituents. But we were hoping to find ourselves referring to surfaces, not to
abstract entities. We seem able to refer to fictional characters like Holmes and Anna,
and to speak intelligibly about them; perhaps thinking of our frictionless surface as a
fictional character will help.
I’ll suggest that in some respects this is too optimistic a picture of the aid that re-
flection on fiction can bring to our understanding of scientific modelling.
2. TRUE-IN AND TRUE-ACCORDING-TO
On one issue at least I think the philosophers of science have been misled by false
advertising from the philosophers of fictions—I include myself among the guilty par-
ties. Philosophers of science have said that the idea of something being true-in-a-
fiction is useful to them, and we philosophers of fiction have certainly offered theo-
ries labelled “theories of truth in fiction” (we have not agreed on which is the right
one).9 It was a mistake for us to label them this way; we should have called them the-
ories of truth-in-a-story. Sometimes fiction and story are not distinguished; “Tell me
a story” sounds like an invitation to communicate something fictional. But fiction
and story are not the same; history and journalism as well as fiction provide us with
stories. Among the things that are true-in-Anna Karenina some are not true, while
some are true; so we need the true/true-in distinction for fictions. And we need it
also for nonfictional narratives. Sadly, not everything historians claim turns out to be
true, so there are things that are “true-in” an historical account which are not true.
Just as with fictional stories, nonfictional ones are silent on certain issues; just as
there is no n such that it is true-in-Macbeth that Lady Macbeth had n children, there
may be no n such that it is true-in-the-history-text that Caesar was stabbed n times at
his assassination. We realists about the past think that there is a positive n such that
Caesar was stabbed n times at his assassination even if no history specifies that num-
ber, and we don’t think that there is a positive n which is the number of the Macbeth
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children, but that has no bearing on the present question. And just as unresolvable
interpretive disputes can make it indeterminate whether something is true in the fic-
tion, so ambiguity in a nonfictional text can generate a parallel indeterminacy. We
may value ambiguity in fiction and deplore it in nonfiction; that, again, is nothing to
the question.
Perhaps a significant difference between fictional and nonfictional cases still exists.
With nonfiction it can seem more appropriate to say that something is true “accord-
ing to” the story than to say that it is true “in” the story; “true-in-the-story” seems to
carry implications of being true somewhere, that somewhere being, for fictional cases,
the “world of the fiction.” But—so the reasoning goes—while consistent nonfictions
are true in some possible worlds, those worlds are not the ones where they are sup-
posed to be true. So for nonfiction the relevant contrast is between what is said to be
true and what is true; that what you said is true in some nonactual worlds is of no
help to you as speaker or me as hearer. Nonfiction, we can say, is oriented towards
actuality. But fictions don’t sustain the same dichotomy, because fictions are not sup-
posed to be true (aka actually true). They are true somewhere else. They are not so
oriented.
I disagree, seeing no relevant difference between the fictional and the nonfictional
cases. “True-according-to” strikes me as good terminology for both kinds. There is
of course a difference between nonfiction and fiction: the former is aimed primarily
at securing belief while the latter aims primarily to have us imagine things, and belief
and imagination are different in various ways.10 But they are not different in their
orientation towards actuality. Explaining the point will seem, for a moment, to dis-
tract us from our topic.
If you lay before me all the possible worlds I can’t tell you which one is actual.
For worlds are individuated by what is going on in them and we do not know every-
thing that is going on. The more we know, the more we are able to narrow the class
of worlds that are candidates for actuality, though we never reduce this to a single-
ton. Thus far I take actuality to lie within a certain class of worlds; these are the
worlds where all I so far believe is true. Reading a history text, I may take it as an in-
vitation to believe various things; I take on board what it says and come to believe
that actuality lies within a narrower class, the class of worlds where all I previously
believed, together with all the beliefs I acquired from the text, are true.11
So much for the nonfiction case; the story I tell about the impact of fiction is
strictly parallel to this, with imagination substituted for belief. I am reading Oliver
Twist and take it as an invitation to imagine things. At the start, let’s assume, I have
no relevant imaginings in place; in this null case imagination places actuality in a
class of worlds no narrower than the class of all possible worlds. But as I read, I start
to narrow this class. I imagine actuality to contain Oliver, Fagin, and the Dodger. As
I am introduced to more characters and events, this class gets progressively nar-
rower.12 I don’t believe actuality to be in the class of worlds I end up with, but I do
imagine that it does. Imagining is as oriented to the actual as belief is.
This refusal to interpolate a “world of the story” between the text and the reader’s
conception of reality helps, a bit, with understanding models in science. Supposing
there to be some place where things are true (“true-in-fiction”) encourages the view
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that the scientist’s modelling efforts, while not true of the target (though approximat-
ing to it) are true of something; they are true-in-the-model. So the model is now
postulated as an entity between our description and the target system (call that the
intermediary view). But the discussion above suggests that we ought not to think
this way.13 The model is a representation of actuality and may be to some extent a
false representation of it, perhaps even a necessarily false one. But all we need to
make sense of this is a contrast between what is true and what is true according to
the model: we don’t need, additionally, a place where what is true according to the
model is true. And the notion we have imported to motivate this point—truth-ac-
cording-to-a-story—is neutral between fiction and nonfiction.
Might there not be differences between fictional and nonfictional cases when it
comes to specifying general rules concerning what is true-according-to? If there are,
we might end up modelling truth-according-to-the-model on truth-according-to-
fiction after all. I am far from having an answer to this question; we have not been
able, so far, to give an uncontroversial account of truth-according-to for fictional
cases and nonfictional cases have hardly been investigated. But there is no a priori
reason why, if there are systematic differences, the account of truth-according-to a
scientific model should be closer to the account for fiction than it is to nonfiction. So
I admit the possibility but see at present no reason to believe things will turn out
that way.
Indeed stories or narratives, fictional or not, might not turn out to be the best
guide to understanding truth-according-to-the-model. Stories are just one kind of
representation and other kinds accept the “according to” construction. We do want
to confine ourselves to relatively complex yet systematic bodies of representation:
the kind of thing Lewis calls a corpus. Among the corpora are data banks, almanacs,
text books, systems of belief (personal and communal), stories, scientific models.14
These are all complex systematic forms of representation according to which various
things are true that are not, in fact, true. If there are systematic differences between
all these different kinds of corpora with respect to how truth-according-to gets deter-
mined15 we have, again, no reason yet to think that fictional and modelling cases are
especially similar.
3. ONTOLOGY
What about all the work done on the ontology of fictional characters? The friction-
less surfaces of scientific models should, at the least, be surfaces, not abstracta; simi-
larly with the perfectly rational agents of certain economic models. It is said that by
taking seriously the fictional status of models we can think of these things as surfaces
and people, with the proviso that they are imaginary ones. Roman Frigg puts it like
this:
What is missing in the structuralist conception is an analysis of the physical
character of model systems. The view of model systems that I advocate regards
them as imagined physical systems, i.e. as hypothetical entities that, as a matter
of fact, do not exist spatio-temporally but are nevertheless not purely mathem-
atical or structural in that they would be physical things if they were real.16
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Frigg says that models (and their constituents) do not exist spatio-temporally,
which suggests that somehow they exist in another way. But if these are physical
things, as he wants them to be, how could they exist in any other way? He also
says that “they would be physical things if they were real,” suggesting that they
do not exist. Or is the idea that they exist as mere possibilia? For many, recog-
nizing the existence of merely possible surfaces is not metaphysically acceptable;
anyway it does not solve the problem. There is (granting that locution for the
moment) a possible individual who does everything that the Holmes stories say
are done and who has genetic make-up X; there is, in some other possible
world perhaps, another possible individual who does those things and has gen-
etic make-up Y. They can’t both be Holmes, but neither is a better candidate
than the other. So neither is Holmes nor is any other candidate.17 Which pos-
sible surface is the one I am considering as I study the model before me?
There are too many candidates among the possible surfaces. And what of enti-
ties which are contradictory, as some entities postulated by scientific models are
said to be? Possible entities won’t help here.
There are views currently on the table according to which creatures of fiction
do exist. These views do not provide what fictionalists about scientific modelling
seem to want from an ontology.18 If there is a worry in thinking of models as
structures and their elements as abstract entities, the same sorts of worries will
arise in thinking of them as creatures of fiction. According to the theories I
have in mind, fictional characters like Holmes do exist but do not have the
properties we normally think of them as having, such as being human. Holmes
is, exactly, a fictional character, an abstract object created, perhaps, by Doyle in
the act of writing stories. He is not a detective or even a human, for no human
is created in the act of writing.19 Talk of Holmes being a human and a detect-
ive is to be understood as recognizing not that Holmes possesses these proper-
ties, but that they are ascribed to him (it).20 If that is the right view it looks as
if we must say that the frictionless surfaces of scientific modelling are not fric-
tionless and not surfaces but abstract entities to which these properties are
ascribed, and we are back where we started.
Perhaps it will be suggested, more radically, that fictionalism dissolves the onto-
logical problem; we don’t need to ask what Holmes is, but merely to note that read-
ers pretend that Holmes is a detective, that he exists, etc. All we need countenance is
a psychological attitude, not a mysterious entity.21 But then we need a story about
what it is to pretend that Holmes is a detective. Pretending that Holmes is a detect-
ive is different from pretending that Poirot is a detective; it looks as if the difference
is the contents of the two propositions pretended. What distinguishes them?
Answering seems to call on us to assign distinct semantic values to “Holmes” and to
“Poirot,” and we are back with the ontological project again. There are many solu-
tions on offer here, including a class of solutions which offer positive accounts of rep-
resentations containing empty names, which can of course appear in fictional and
nonfictional contexts.22 What won’t do as a solution is to assume that, where the rep-
resentations in question are ones we take the attitude of imagining or pretending to,
no problem arises.
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4 . FICTION AS MODELLING
Let us look at the models/fictions comparison from the other direction. I have
argued that there is not much in the metaphysics of fictions as ordinarily understood
that is helpful for thinking about models in science. Ronald Giere makes a distinction
that is useful for thinking about the relations between the two: a distinction between
ontological and functional similarities. Fictions and models might be very similar
entities with quite distinct functions. I will give the question about functional similar-
ity a particular formulation, one that focuses on the functions of models and fictions
in learning. I take it for granted that what gives models a role in science is that we
can learn from them. What I don’t take for granted and what I am interested in find-
ing more about, is whether ordinary fictions function in anything like the way that
models in science do when it comes to learning. My goal here is to bring some clarity
and systematicity to the often-expressed but inchoate view that we learn from fic-
tions, that fictions—the usual examples are the high-value literary fictions such as
those of Proust and Tolstoy—are able to tell us something novel about the real
world. So my question is whether there are informative similarities between the ways
we learn from models and the ways we learn from fictions.
Those involved in the debate about whether scientific models are fictions have
not so far addressed this problem, perhaps because they see relatively little opportun-
ity for learning from fiction in the first place.23 Discussing fictionalism about scien-
tific modelling, Peter Godfrey-Smith says, “There is some learning about the world
from literary fictions, but this is a comparatively low-powered phenomenon that
does not pose special problems.”24 Many humanistically inclined scholars will object.
Strong claims are often made in the literary media about the supposed benefits of lit-
erary fiction, said to range from the transmission of a kind of collective wisdom to
the inculcation of empathic and other socially desirable skills and dispositions; these
claims are sometimes made in the course of defending the place of literature in the
school curriculum. Concrete support for these claims is not often provided, and the
available evidence is in fact somewhat thin.25 That may be because we do not yet
have theories about how fiction induce learning; with better theories we might con-
struct experimental scenarios that reveal significant but unobvious effects. Even if
learning from fiction turns out to be low powered, an interesting question arises as
to how it is possible to learn from fiction at all. Perhaps the process of modelling in
science can help us solve the problem.
Is it sensible to think that we can learn from fiction? After all, to imagine some-
thing is not in itself to learn anything. But imagining is sometimes done in the cause
of learning; imagining trying to get that large armchair through my front door leads
me to the belief that it will not fit and determines me not to buy it.26 The point of
certain fictions is often to get us to change our beliefs as a result of what we imagine,
as many people did, apparently, on imagining the characters and events described in
Uncle Tom’s Cabin. Also, there are ways to learn from fiction that need not involve
imagining things. One is to assume the verisimilitude of a fiction’s background. This
is perhaps most notable with historical fictions which are supposed to follow the
course of known events as far as possible and which are subject to criticism if they
fail to do so without good reason. But no genre of fiction is without such constraints;
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ghost stories are expected to get the details of their locations right if they are set in
identifiable places, and Ian Fleming was criticized for allowing Bond to order
Champagne in a half-bottle when the brand in question was unavailable in that size.
The little I know (or believe) about Russian society in the nineteenth century is
derived from reading Tolstoy’s fiction; I assumed, reasonably I think, that Tolstoy
knew a good deal about the facts of that society and took some care to respect them
in constructing his story. Readers who assumed that Fleming knew what
Champagnes were available in what sizes were mislead.
While this suggests the possibility of learning from fiction, it does not support the
idea of a close relation between fictions and models. We do not treat models in sci-
ence as mere indicators of the opinions of their makers; the model has a maker but
we are learning from the model, not from the maker. And learning which depends
on the reliability of another agent is a way of transmitting knowledge, not of generat-
ing it, whereas models are thought of as devices for knowledge generation.27 Is that
sort of model-based learning possible in fiction? Some assume so. Richard Wollheim,
for example, cites the behaviour of Proust’s characters to support claims in moral
psychology.28 Wollheim’s idea is, I take it, that if we focus on the characters, their
situations, and their responses to them, we find in those responses things revelatory
of human character. He is not pointing, in this context at least, to Proust’s reliability
on questions of human motivation. We learn from Hamlet and Ophelia rather than
from Shakespeare; from Mr. and Mrs. Verloc rather than from Conrad. Engaging
with these characters and situations, we see in them realistically human traits and ac-
tions for which we don’t need the support of a belief in the reliability of their cre-
ators; they have an intrinsic credibility. This suggests, at last, a genuine similarity
between literary fictions and scientific models: both provide learning by enabling us
to see how a system operates under certain conditions: a gravitational system in the
one case, a system of interacting persons in another. Catherine Elgin who emphasizes
the causally simplifying assumptions of at least some fictions offers something like
this picture:
[A] work of fiction selects and isolates, manipulating circumstances so that
particular properties, patterns, connections, disparities and irregularities are
brought to the fore. It may localize and isolate factors that underlie or are
interwoven into everyday life, but that are apt to pass unnoticed because they
are typically overshadowed by other, more prominent concerns. This is why
Jane Austen believed that “three or four families in a country village is the very
thing to work on.” [note omitted]. The relations among the members of the
three or four families are sufficiently complicated and the demands of village
life sufficiently mundane that the story can exemplify something worth noting
about ordinary life and the development of moral personality. By restricting
her attention to three or four fictional families, Austen in effect devises a tightly
controlled thought experiment. Drastically limiting the factors that affect her
protagonists enables her to elaborate in detail the consequences of the few that
remain.29
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Austen’s communities are not isolated from external influences such as Frank
Churchill, illness, or nationally imposed systems of inheritance, and insistence on a
very restricted canvas would suggest that there is little to be learned from War and
Peace.30 All fictions, no matter how large their ambitions, select from the flow of
events; how much confidence should this give us in the epistemic role of fiction? I
will suggest a range of significantly destabilizing factors, including one to do with
simplicity, which collectively undermine the idea that canonical fictions such as
Austen’s (or Tolstoy’s for that matter) function to illuminate causal-intentional proc-
esses through model-like simplification. Understanding these factors will require us
to look beyond the models and the fictions themselves, and to see them in their rele-
vant contexts. We have moved on, as I said we would, from thinking about the ontol-
ogy of models and fictions to thinking about their functions, and in particular their
epistemic function.31 To comprehend those functions we have to see them as parts
of broader systems of cognitive activity that include institutions of knowledge-
gathering.
5. TRUTH AND THE FEELING OF TRUTH
Scientific models have a relatively well-understood role in the system of knowledge
creation that science represents. Providing computational tractability is one function
of models already noted. There are others. Models have a heuristic role in developing
more realistic theories. They enable us to “probe the resources” of the theories in ap-
proximation to which they are conceived.32 They may even serve explanatory as well
as predictive purposes despite their acknowledged falsity.33 Some of this is disputed
but we can, at least, speak coherently and in detail about the relations between mod-
els and the growth of scientific knowledge. Nothing comparable is available to help
us assess the epistemic value of novels, films, and other fictions. We have no more
than the vague suggestion that fictions sometimes shed light on aspects of human
thought, feeling, decision, and action; a proposition that so far no one has found a
way to test.
This raises an interesting question: what persuades us to say, as we often do, that
a fiction is “truthful”? Truthfulness in these contexts does not seem to mean any-
thing as ordinary as getting your facts right, and people struggle when asked what
exactly they find truthful in an avowedly fictional story. I suggest that these utter-
ances express something psychologists have gone some way towards understanding:
a “feeling for truth” that people often invoke in praising the realism, or the realistic
implications of a fiction. We know that the feeling for truth is highly unreliable; it is
predictably activated by factors that have nothing to do with truth. Subjects express
greater confidence in a principle if it is expressed as a rhyme (“A stitch in time saves
nine”) than if it is not (“Too many cooks spoil the broth”)—and statements that
rhyme are not more often true than statements that don’t.34 The tendency to be
influenced in judgements of truth-value by irrelevant factors has been widely studied,
sometimes under the heading of “fluency” or perceived ease of processing; rhyming
verse makes prediction of the final word easier since the space of possibilities is dra-
matically reduced.35 There is also a general tendency to be more persuaded by a
message when it is accompanied by some pleasurable stimulus, including such things
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as the speaker’s attractiveness.36 The range of aesthetic features of literary works be-
yond rhyme have not been examined for their effects on the feeling for truth but it is
certainly plausible that such things as evocative description, placement of emotionally
charged incident, and vivid characterization—all features we look for in fiction—pro-
vide pleasures which will boost the feeling for truth.37
The idea that literary, dramatic, and filmic narratives offer so many triggers for
the feeling for truth suggests a further disanalogy between fictions and models.
Models are not dependent for their value in learning on any particular formulation;
rather they depend on their capacity to get good predictive or explanatory results or
to achieve some other epistemic aim. Literary fictions are not, we have seen, predict-
ive and they do depend on their formulations, especially on their emotionally rele-
vant features, to convince. It’s Shakespeare’s or Jane Austen’s or Marcel Proust’s
particular choices of words and their order that matter, and different formulations
would significantly affect the extent to which readers would regard their representa-
tions as truthful.38
6. CAUSAL STORIES
The next disanalogy between fictions and models I will call causal fragmentation:
While models are generally in the business of simplifying and perhaps idealizing the
causal processes they model, they do aim to give a comprehensive account of the as-
pects of causation on which they focus, as when a model generates a predicted path
for Mercury around the sun based on the assumption that no other bodies contribute
to the net gravitational force. We don’t find that the model says nothing about large
portions of the orbit, simply taking up the story again at some future point without
any accounting for how we got from there to here; if it did we would not trust it.
And the causal processes represented in the model have an important kind of auton-
omy: the act of constructing the model generally involves specifying a set of equa-
tions and their domains of application. Once specified, the entities of the model are
understood to behave in accordance with the equations and are not governed by the
choices of the model maker. But literary fictions do not do anything like this. They
deliver highly fragmented representations of processes which focus on moments of
dramatic power capable of holding our attentions, simply ignoring chunks of the
causal-temporal process deemed to be of less dramatic interest. And where causation
is represented, as when thought is described as leading to action, there is no point at
which intentional control is relinquished. Whatever happens between the thought
and the behaviour represents the author’s choice of what is to happen; the agent in
question acts or fails to act on a thought because the author chooses to have her do
just that. And that choice will be dictated at least partly by dramatic considerations
to do with sustaining the interests of an audience, keeping the narrative on track,
providing an opportunity for later developments that are thought desirable. Authors
are thereby able to create impressions of plausible causal consequence between ante-
cedent circumstances and outcomes by highlighting selected components of a causal
sequence, generating enough narrative momentum to carry us, in imagination, over
the gap. This sort of fragmentation, taken in conjunction with the previous point
about emotional and rhetorical power, means that fictions often have the capacity to
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appear to represent plausible models of human thought and action without that cap-
acity to appear in a certain way counting as evidence that they actually succeed in
this task.
7 . MAKING LIFE MORE COMPLICATED
Elgin, we saw, thinks it significant that fictions simplify. Let us look again at the issue
of complexity versus simplicity. Nancy Cartwright has likened models in science to
fables and, more recently, to parables. Like fables, models provide us with instances
of more general situations and ideas; like parables, they need interpreting.39 Both
fables and parables have another similarity with models: simplification. Models in sci-
ence, while often not simple in any absolute sense, are designed to make problems
tractable by simplifying: ignoring friction, pretending there are only two bodies or
that agents have perfect knowledge and perfect rationality. Fables and parables can
be powerful devices for guiding behaviour and are likely true in certain situations.
But they are unrepresentative of the corpus of fiction we have, and are especially un-
representative of the novelistic and dramatic tradition that has been central to the
humanistic arguments about learning from literature. These works tend to generate
complexity rather than simplification, presenting the circumstances of social life as
more surprising and unpredictable, more packed with incident than they are in real-
ity. There are good reasons for that. Fictions of substantial length work by engaging
readers, keeping them guessing, having characters act in unexpected ways, subject to
conversions of outlook and behaviour rarely seen in the real world, more distinct
one from another than real people tend to be, and more resistant to submersion in
the flow of events than real people tend to be since the behaviour of real people is
often predictable from circumstance.40 Fictions can hardly be expected to function in
any way similar to that of models when they answer to quite different imperatives
from those of modelling.
8 . INSTITUTIONS
This last point raises a broader question about what we might call the epistemic insti-
tutions of fiction and those of modelling. It is not an accident that in science we fre-
quently come upon examples of successful models: models with excellent predictive
power, highly suggestive of further theoretical and explanatory moves. Science is
organized in such a way as to focus its participants on success in these things; they
are the things which bring professional advancement, and which professional train-
ing, conference attendance, and seminar presentations reinforce. The effect of these
pressures is, unsurprisingly, to drive a search for ever more effective ways of achiev-
ing epistemic goals. While literature has extensive institutions, none of them are epi-
stemic; awards of literary prizes are not contingent on stringent tests of whether the
sense we have on reading the novel of what some experience is like is really what
that experience is like. We have no idea how to conduct such tests and no one would
award prizes based on their outcomes if we did. It would be surprising to find that
some complex and difficult goal was being regularly achieved by an activity the or-
ganization of which took no account of that goal and did nothing to promote it.
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9 . LOOKING IN THE WRONG PLACE
These are some of the reasons it is unlikely that literary activity is closely analogous
to modelling in science, and even less likely that we will find it successful as meas-
ured by the standards regularly applied to modelling. I grant that, from a certain
point of view, the discussion leading to this conclusion can seem odd. Of course,
someone might say, we don’t learn from fictions in anything like the way we learn
from models; to assume that learning from fiction, if there is any, should be of this
kind would be to condemn fictions as epistemically useless because fictions are radic-
ally different from models in science. Instead fictions provide the following: exercis-
ing and refining imaginative capacities; providing us with novel and sometimes
interesting perspectives which may provoke interesting thoughts; providing us with
opportunities to exercise skills of mind reading, empathy, and interpersonal inter-
pretation in ways which improve those skills while avoiding the potentially costly
mistakes that encounters with real others make probable.41 These are all significant if
indirect contributions to learning which it is plausible to think are made by certain
fictions. I agree that these are the better places to look, though all such claims need
to be well supported by evidence before they can be accepted, and the currently
available evidence is not impressive. In seeking evidence for anything we should look
first at places that have the higher probability of disclosing it. When it comes to evi-
dence for learning from fiction, looking at the epistemology of scientific modelling is
a region of low probability.42
NOTES
1. For the Ehrenfest model see Barberousse and Ludwig (2009). For the plum pudding, see Suarez (2009,
162–63).
2. Achinstein (1968) characterised models largely in terms of the known falsity of assumption, useful be-
cause they combine simplification and approximation. Vaihinger, more or less the founder of fictional-
ism, says little about literature or the imagination. There is brief discussion of “aesthetic” and “poetic”
fictions, and of mythology; centaurs, griffins, and other nonexistents are said to be important for the the-
ory of existential propositions but of “minor importance for our present theme” (1924, 82).
3. Theories of fiction often appealed to in this context have been Currie (1990), and Walton (1990). For
negative assessments of this idea see Giere (2009) and Teller (2009).
4. Later on I will question this way of putting the matter; see below, Section 2.
5. Versions of this view are developed in Walton (1990) and Currie (1990). One dissenter is Matravers
(2014), though he does not claim that belief is the appropriate response to fictions. For more dissent,
confined to the cinematic case, see Quilty-Dunn (2015).
6. Williams (1973) offered the first of these as the reason why the second is true. There is now a substantial
literature on both, with no agreement as to the truth of either or even their best formulations.
7. I ignore some complications here. For more detail see my (2014a).
8. See Walton (1990; 2015).
9. See Lewis (1983), Currie (1990, chapter 3), Byrne (1993).
10. There is currently a debate over whether we can define fiction in terms of its functioning or being in-
tended to secure a distinctive attitude of imagining on the part of an audience (see e.g., Friend 2012;
Currie 2014b). But even those who deny this might agree with the sentence above. If they do not, that’s
one less difference between fiction and nonfiction for me to worry about, at least for the purposes of this
paper.
11. I assume here for simplicity that the new beliefs I get cause no revision to the prior set.
12. The right formulation here depends on your views about the ontology of fictional characters; perhaps it
is better to say that I imagine actuality to contain someone called “Oliver” who does such and such, and
someone called. . . etc. For more on this issue see below, Section 3.
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13. My conclusion here is similar to that of Toon (2012), especially pp. 42–43 and p. 56. Toon is arguing
against Frigg (2010a). I do not follow Toon in putting weight on the distinction between cases where
scientists model a real system and cases where they “describe an imaginary system.”
14. See Lewis (1998) especially p. 102.
15. The whole thing might, on the other hand, be a mess with no general principles discernible at any level.
16. Frigg 2010b, 253.
17. See e.g. Kripke (2013, Lecture II). My own view, as represented in my (1990), is that, while it is
pretence that “Holmes” is a proper name, it is actually a definite description of a particularly com-
plex kind that is occupied by no one in the actual world but by various people in various possible
worlds. It is not a consequence of that view that “Holmes” as used by any of us refers to any of
these people. Various people, notably Robert Stecker, have made me see the defects of that earlier
theory; I have no firm opinion on this now other than to deny that people who use “Holmes” are
referring to anyone.
18. Giere says that scientific models and works of fiction share “an ontology of imagined objects” (2009,
251) without telling us what that ontology is.
19. If Holmes the fictional character was not created by Doyle (as argued by Brock [2010]) he was also cer-
tainly (and necessarily) not created in the way real humans are.
20. This is van Inwagen’s way of putting it (1977).
21. Frigg does not seem to be adopting this perspective in the passage I have quoted from above.
22. See e.g., Sainsbury (2009). For a variety of approaches see the essays in Garcıa-Carpintero and Martıi,
eds. (2014). See also Friend (2011) and Salis (2013).
23. As noted by Frigg (2010a, 125–26).
24. Godfrey-Smith 2009, 110.
25. See my (2013) and (forthcoming).
26. An upbeat case for learning from imagination is provided in Williamson (2014).
27. Cases have been cited as supporting the idea that testimony can generate knowledge as well as transmit
it (see Lackey’s “fundamentalist biology teacher” and variations thereon [Lackey 1999]; [Graham
2006]). What I am calling reliability-based knowledge is a broader category than testimony; at least
some of the things I learn from reading War and Peace are not things which Tolstoy is intending to con-
vey to an audience; his writing in the way he does merely indicates his belief in these things. But Lackey-
style cases, if they work for testimony will work also for cases of mere belief-indication. Tolstoy might
have had very odd and unreliable beliefs about Russian society but have written as if he had conventional
opinions so as not to upset his readership; the beliefs one picks up from reading his work would be as re-
liable in that case as they would have been had he actually believed these things. I grant, for the sake of
the argument, that cases of knowledge generation are possible in cases where (1) the knowledge is based
on assumptions of authorial reliability and (2) the author accepts but does not believe the propositions
in question. But if this is the only way for reliability-based knowledge to be knowledge-generating rather
than merely knowledge-preserving, the stark difference between this and the standard means by which
we get knowledge from models remains; models regularly generate knowledge without the need for ap-
peals to authorial reliability.
28. Wollheim 1984, 82–83, 170.
29. Elgin 2010, 7.
30. Elgin speaks specifically of thought experiments, which we might think of as, in many cases at least, par-
ticular operations of models. But thought experiments deserve a treatment of their own for which I have
not space here.
31. See Suarez (2009).
32. See Redhead (1980), a complex but rewarding account of the actual use of models in scientific practice.
33. See Bokulich (2009).
34. Reber and Schwarz 1999; McGlone and Tofighbakhsh 2000.
35. See Fabb (2014).
36. See Chaiken (1979).
37. A complication here is that literary effects and the pleasures that go with them are often connected with
increases in complexity that we would expect to reduce fluency and hence reduce the feeling for truth.
But while effects that reduce fluency, such as use of long words, generally also reduce credence there are
situations that will induce the opposite effect (see e.g., Oppenheimer [2006, experiment 5]). It is a
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plausible but as yet untested hypothesis that an audience keen to rise to the challenge of deliberately dis-
fluent prose (think of Henry James) will be influenced by the feeling for truth as a result of the pleasure
that comes from succeeding in this difficult task.
38. As David Velleman (2003) has noted, we may easily mistake the emotional arc of a narrative, with
its satisfying conclusion, for a satisfactory explanation of the events on which it focuses. We can
slightly soften the conclusion (text above) by noting that not all models in science are intended to
function predictively: some have a heuristic role in the further development of thinking. Perhaps
this is the closest that models and fictions come together: fictions can perhaps be thought of as
suggesting ways of thinking about human motivation, rationality, responsibility, and other puzzles
of existence.
39. See her (1999, 36–44; 2010).
40. See the literature on situational versus character-based explanations of behavior, discussed in my (2010,
chapter 11).
41. “. . .a work of literature (or music) might expand our conceptual repertoire, leading us to approach our
experiences with new categories and to react to experience in different ways. . .” (Kitcher 2013, 16).
42. An earlier version of this paper was read at a conference on Scientific Fiction Making, Institute of
Philosophy, London in June 2015. I am grateful to the audience on that occasion, including Alisa
Bokulich, Roman Frigg, Stacie Friend, Mauricio Suarez, and Adam Toon for their helpful comments. I
am especially indebted to Fiora Salis for a very helpful set of written comments.
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